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In early December, President Trump brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a completely opposite approach to conflict emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President stated, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Strategic Pivot

This dichotomy encapsulates the core tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on trade and ending wars—even as this fits with the emerging military strikes in Nigeria is an open question.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a senior U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative echoed this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Contradictions

This shift is major, but analysts caution it is too soon to judge its results. The approach is influenced by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Strains

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant feud has developed with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Selective Involvement

An analogous confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

An Echo of Other Powers

Experts describe the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.